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By ARTHUR GAUS*
Introduction
ANONYMITY DEFINES THE INTERNET. On the Internet, users can
share information and ideas, engage in commercial transactions, and
debate relevant issues without ever having to reveal their true identi-
ties. Anonymity, however, comes with lowered inhibitions. Without
the threat of a blot on one’s good name, Internet users operate unen-
cumbered by generally accepted social norms and, as a result, are
more prone to say and do things that they perhaps would not under
their real identities. Benefits certainly do exist: The anonymity of the
Internet has promoted a freer exchange of ideas and a more diverse
online economy.1 Anonymity in general, however, erodes accountabil-
ity. The Internet’s diminished capacity for accountability has bred
small but powerful communities of Internet “trolls.”2 The conduct of
these communities and the individuals affiliated with them is ex-
tremely varied; it ranges from benign contrarian behavior on online
message boards to the destructive circulation of intentionally harmful
Internet memes.3 This paper will demonstrate that our current legal
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1. Zizi Papacharissi, The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere, 4 NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 9, 26 (2002), available at http://tigger.uic.edu/~zizi%20/Site/Research_files/Virtual
Sphere.pdf.
2. Defined infra Part I.A, “trolls” refers generally to Internet users who engage in a
broad spectrum of intentionally mischievous behavior designed to illicit strong reactions
from the targets of their activities. See Ana Marie Cox, Making Mischief on the Web, TIME
(Dec. 16, 2006), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570701,00.html.
3. “Meme” is a neologism of the Internet, defined as “an image, video, piece of text,
etc., typically humorous in nature, that is copied and spread rapidly by Internet users,
often with slight variations.” Meme Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictiona-
ries.com/definition/english/meme (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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infrastructure—designed without the harms of the online world in
mind—is unsuited to handle the most harmful and insidious forms of
Internet “trolling.” In response, it will propose an updated tort regime
to compensate the victims of this behavior and deter future attacks.
I. The Basics of Trolling
A. What is Trolling, Generally?
A wide variety of behavior falls under the umbrella of online trol-
ling, and it produces a wide spectrum of harms. On the less harmful
end of the spectrum are intentionally provocative postings to message
boards, sometimes referred to as “concern trolling.”4 This behavior
generally involves anonymously posting intentionally contrarian or
sometimes shocking ideas to disrupt online debates.5 This form of
trolling warrants no regulatory effort because the harms are negligi-
ble. Even the most pernicious forms of “concern trolling” harm only
the integrity of the online community attacked and generally can be
addressed through careful self-moderation of the offended forums.6
B. Lulz Trolling
On the other end of the spectrum are the trolling attacks that
require new regulation. The most harmful forms of trolling, the forms
with which this paper is most concerned, are often classified under
the umbrella of “cyberbullying” or “cyberharassment.”7 Broadly de-
fined, cyberbullying refers to malicious online behavior where both
the perpetrator and the target are minors.8 By contrast, cyberharass-
ment refers to malicious behavior where one or both parties are
adults.9 These forms are distinguishable from more benign trolling
behaviors in that they frequently involve elements of what Nancy Kim
has described as “cyberdeception” or “online insults” and usually in-
volve the use of images.10 Also, the targets of these attacks are fre-
quently not acquainted with the perpetrators outside of the context of
the attack.11
4. Cox, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. Nancy S. Kim, Web Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 3 UTAH L. REV. 993,
995–96 (2009).
8. What is Cyberbullying Exactly?, STOPCYBERBULLYING, http://www.stopcyberbullying.
org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
9. Id.
10. Kim, supra note 7.
11. Id. at 1009.
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A wide variety of online behaviors produce these trolling attacks.
For example, a notorious cyberdeception case involved an anonymous
Craigslist user posting a phony solicitation for sex on Craigslist.12 The
advertisement encouraged viewers to respond with highly explicit re-
sponses and photographs.13 The author of the advertisement then
published all the responses, including photos, personal e-mails and
phone numbers on a popular website for the trolling community.14
From there, the personal information and photographs of those who
responded to the ad were disseminated to the Internet at large.15 Peo-
ple associated with the ad suffered real consequences—some lost jobs,
some lost marriages, and all had their reputations viciously sullied.16
Another trolling attack that fits the category of cyberdeception
involved the “Megan Had It Coming” blog. In 2007, a 13 year-old girl
named Megan Meier committed suicide after receiving a message via
MySpace from another user who claimed to be a teenage boy.17 The
investigation of the suicide later revealed that the user who suggested
to Meier that she kill herself was not a teenage boy, but an identity
fabricated by Lori Drew, the mother of one of Meier’s former
friends.18 After the case became a media sensation, a blog titled
“Megan Had It Coming” appeared on a popular blog-hosting site.19
The author of the blog, supposedly one of Megan’s classmates, wrote
that the deceased girl was a “drama queen” and that Drew could not
be blamed for Meier’s death.20 Later, the author of the blog claimed
to be Lori Drew, a claim that turned out to be false.21 Again, the con-
sequences were harmful in very real terms. First, Meier’s family suf-
fered the indignity of having their deceased daughter’s name
tarnished. Second, after the author fraudulently claimed to be Lori
Drew, the Drew family was flooded with phone calls and bricks were
thrown through their windows.22 Lori Drew’s legal defense was also
12. Mathias Schwartz, The Trolls Among Us, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 3, 2008, at 24,
26–27.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 26.
16. Id.
17. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 26–27.
18. Key Events in the Megan Meier Case, USATODAY.COM, May 15, 2008, http://usatoday
30.usatoday.com/tech/products/2008-05-15-1838288037_x.htm.
19. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 26.
20. Id. at 26–27.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Id. at 26.
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made more difficult by the existence of a blog where the author pur-
ported to be a defiant, unrepentant Drew.23
By comparison, trolling attacks that fit Kim’s “online insults” cate-
gory cause the same types of harms as cyberdeception but involve to-
tally different behaviors. For example, in 2007, the Washington Post ran
a story about the web forum AutoAdmit that created a scandal at Yale
Law School.24 The paper conducted several interviews with female law
students who chose to remain anonymous for fear of online reprisals
from Internet trolls.25 The story detailed how anonymous classmates
of theirs at Yale were using AutoAdmit to post personally-identifying
information about the subjects of the story without their permission,
along with sexually abusive language directed at them.26 Posts on
AutoAdmit also openly criticized the women’s intelligence, qualifica-
tions, and capabilities as law students.27 Again, the women suffered
real injuries. One woman in the story reported that she had not re-
ceived any job offers after being the subject of the AutoAdmit trolling
attack.28 Another said that she no longer went to the gym because the
website encouraged users to take pictures of her.29 This type of trol-
ling attack produces the same types of real-world harms as those in-
volving cyberdeception; however, the specific behaviors that cause the
harm are different.
C. What Internet Trolling Behavior Needs Regulation?
The Internet trolling community is difficult to define, much less
regulate, because trolls are obsessive about maintaining their anonym-
ity. Due to their close association with hacker communities,30 trolls
tend to be savvy Internet users and much more adept at protecting
their own individual privacy than ordinary Internet users. Also, since
23. MySpace Mom Linked to Missouri Teen’s Suicide Being Cyber-Bullied Herself, FOXNEWS
.COM (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,315684,00.html.
24. Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at
A1, A9.
25. Id. at A1.
26. Id.; see also, e.g., Kathryn E. Swisher, The AutoAdmit Scandal and Legal Remedies for
Online Victimization, 17 PERSP. 10, 10 (2009).
27. Nakashima, supra note 24, at A1.
28. Id.
29. Id. at A9.
30. Generally speaking, a “hacker” refers to “a person who illegally gains access to and
sometimes tampers with information in a computer system.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 559 (11th ed. 2005). By contrast, a “troll” is defined as either “a delib-
erately provocative online posting intended to incite an angry response” or “a person who
submits a deliberately provocative posting.” Troll Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/troll—2 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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Internet trolling activity promotes, or even requires, group harass-
ment, it makes sense in most cases to define trolls as a community.
Viewed through this prism, trolls generally can be defined as loosely
connected groups of individuals who associate on highly unregulated
and unmoderated message boards.31 The best example of a trolling-
friendly Internet forum is the notorious “/b/” forum on the Internet
site 4chan.com, which has served as a launching point for several infa-
mous trolling attacks.32 In one example, a trolling meme that may
have originated on a 4chan thread developed into a protracted, or-
ganized attack on former model Charlotte Dawson.33 Trolls flooded
Dawson’s twitter account and e-mail inbox with vicious invectives, calls
for her to kill herself, and grotesque images.34 After weeks of the on-
line harassment, Dawson attempted suicide.35 The /b/ forum self-reg-
ulates (with only limited success) by prohibiting child pornography,
the posting of personal information, and open calls to disrupt the
function of other websites or online businesses.36 Beyond that, there
are few rules or definitions of what will disqualify a participant.37 This
environment fosters an “anything goes” ethos, which functions to cre-
ate a hothouse where participants constantly encourage each other to
push the envelope of posted comments as well as the language and
tenor of the conversation.
In addition to these forums, trolling communities host and pro-
mote websites that venerate the most extreme and notorious trolling
attacks. Websites such as Encyclopedia Dramatica38 contain boastful
first-person accounts of online trolling endeavors for other members
of the community to view and read.39 For example, the so-called “For-
tuny Experiment” involved a member of an online trolling community
who proudly posted the results of a bogus adult personal ad, including
photographs and phone numbers of respondents, on Encyclopedia
31. See, e.g., Rules of the Internet, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/rules-of-the-internet (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
32. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 24, 26.
33. Jenna Sauers, Next Top Model Judge Hospitalized after Twitter Bullying Leads to Sui-
cide Attempt, JEZEBEL (Aug. 30, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://jezebel.com/charlotte-dawson-twit-
ter/.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Rules, 4CHAN, http://www.4chan.org/rules (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
37. It is worthwhile to note that the first moderation rule for the /b/ forum is “ZOMG
NONE!!!1.” Id.
38. ENCYCLOPEDIA DRAMATICA, (Nov. 14, 2012), https://encyclopediadramatica.se/
Main_Page.
39. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 27.
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Dramatica,40 from which it spread to the Internet at large. These sites
provide not only approval to trolls for their actions, but also serve as
models to other trolls who might seek to launch their own hurtful
memes.
D. The Role and Importance of Lulz
The concept of “lulz” is another important but difficult to define
aspect of trolling behavior. Lulz might be described as a successful
attempt to mock or demean the target of an attack.41 A more practical
way to understand lulz is that they are the peer-given rewards for a
successful trolling venture. In other words, trolls use lulz to keep
score.42 In form, lulz are no different than any other peer-based re-
ward, such as congratulations from co-workers, which bolster one’s
reputation. A distinguishing characteristic of lulz, however, is that be-
cause trolls seldom seek to gain financially from their attacks, lulz
have become their central incentive. In place of financial interests,
lulz have become a form of anti-currency. In the general absence of
opportunities for commercial gain from trolling attacks, the prospect
of acquiring lulz, and the accompanying infamy, has become a power-
ful incentive. One anonymous troll has described the motivational
power of lulz in trolling communities as: “1. Do whatever it takes to
get lulz. 2. Make sure the lulz is widely distributed. This will allow for
more lulz to be made. 3. The game is never over until all the lulz have
been had.”43
Finally, these attacks bear another important feature: The targets
are frequently chosen in an arbitrary fashion. The only trait that the
targets of trolling attacks truly share is that some feature of the target
has struck an individual troll or a troll community as amusing. In one
example, a notorious trolling attack started with the suicide of a teen-
age boy.44 Some Internet trolls found a reference on the boy’s MyS-
pace page to a lost iPod and, in the hothouse of trolling forums, it
became settled that the lost iPod was the cause of the boy’s suicide.
Soon after this discovery, the boy’s parents were bombarded with
phone calls, e-mails and letters, many with images of the dead child as
an iPod-clutching zombie or other profane, mocking messages.45
40. The Fortuny Experiment, ENCYCLOPEDIA DRAMATICA, https://encyclopediadramatica.
se/RFJason_CL_Experiment (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
41. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 26.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 24–26.
45. Id. at 26.
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Prior to the attack, nothing connected the deceased child or his fam-
ily with the trolling community that launched the attack. Rather, his
online postings prior to his suicide were simply determined to be suit-
able material for a large-scale trolling attack. This distinguishes trol-
ling attacks from other forms of cyber-bullying where the victim
generally knows the individual perpetrator in the “real” world.
E. The Harms Associated with Lulz Trolling Attacks
Lulz trolling attacks are a cause for legal attention because they
possess several harmful attributes. First, they have obvious potential to
inflict enormous reputational and emotional injury, as demonstrated
by the examples mentioned above. The malicious nature of the con-
tent, combined with the accessibility of the Internet, creates vast po-
tential for harming the targets of trolling attacks. In fact, the explicit
intent of lulz trolling is to harm targets as publicly as possible. In the
lulz community, there is a clear relationship between the amount of
harm and pain caused by the attack and the degree to which the at-
tacker is lauded and celebrated within his or her community. Damage
to reputation and public embarrassment are the actual ends for many
trolling attackers. Therefore, the social incentives driving these trol-
ling communities push the behavior to be more and more malicious,
arbitrary, and harmful.
Second, the arbitrary way that trolls select targets makes the need
for regulation more compelling. Frequently, as in several of the cases
above, the targets have no contact with their attackers prior to the
launch of the attacks. The capricious manner in which targets are se-
lected seems to be a central aspect of the enjoyment that Internet
trolls derive from their actions. The lulz phenomenon was described
by one anonymous troll as “watching someone lose their mind at their
computer 2,000 miles away while you chat with friends and laugh.”46
Third, the frequency of malevolent Internet attacks appears to be
rising. While there are no hard statistics on how often harmful trolling
attacks occur to American citizens, British authorities report that in
2011 they investigated over 400 trolling attacks.47 Additionally, some
for-profit websites have made use of trolling tactics as part of their
business ventures. For example, the adult website isanyoneup.com so-
licits website users for submissions of sexually explicit photos that were
46. Id.
47. Helen Turner, Police Investigate Almost 400 Online ‘Trolling’ Attacks in 2011, WALES
ONLINE.CO.UK (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/2012/01/
03/police-investigate-almost-400-online-trolling-attacks-in-2011-91466-30049563/.
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originally part of private communications.48 The website publishes the
photos, along with the Facebook profiles of the subjects of the pic-
tures, with abusive and sexually explicit commentary.49 The rise in the
number of trolling attacks combined with the new potential for finan-
cial gain from trolling behavior make a compelling case for immedi-
ate and effective regulation.
II. Present Laws are Ill-Equipped to Regulate Trolling
Attacks
The rise in the number of trolling attacks and the brazenness
with which they are carried out demonstrates the insufficiency of the
current legal framework to deal with trolling attacks. As will be dis-
cussed in more detail below, current laws are inadequate in several
ways. First, the scope and coverage of most state laws that could apply
to trolling attacks are usually insufficient to address the actions of on-
line trolling communities. Second, the penalties—even the criminal
penalties—associated with cyberbullying and cyber harassment are in-
sufficient to deter trolling attacks. Finally, the civil causes of action
available to the victims of trolling attacks do not adequately cover the
victims’ injuries.
Compounding the problem is that tort law is presently unable to
provide civil remedies to the victims of trolling attacks. The law of
privacy torts developed during an era that did not anticipate the
threats to privacy that the Internet poses.50 As a result, the privacy
torts, as presently understood, will not support a plaintiff’s cause of
action even when a plaintiff’s injuries are significant.51
A. Criminal Statutes
Criminal statutes regarding harmful online behavior generally
fall into three categories: cyberharassment statutes, cyberstalking stat-
utes and cyberbullying statutes. None of these types of criminal stat-
utes, however, squarely addresses the problems posed by trolling
attacks.
48. Alex Morris, The Most Hated Man on the Internet, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 11, 2012, at
44.
49. Id.
50. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890) (discussing the need for the law to recognize a right to privacy and the imposi-
tion of liability in tort for these and other types of invasions of privacy).
51. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1809–10
(2010) (discussing the need for updated privacy tort law to tackle the information age’s
privacy injuries).
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1. Scope and Coverage
The first and largest problem with present criminal statutes is that
generally they fail to cover the behavior of online trolling
communities.
Thirty-three states and one U.S. territory have stalking statutes
that include language applicable to online behavior.52 The vast major-
ity of cyberstalking statutes, however, are traditional stalking statutes
updated to include stalking behavior that uses computer or cellular
technology. The behaviors targeted by these statutes are threatening
words or actions, unwanted surveillance of a target, or both. Florida’s
cyberstalking statute provides an excellent example.53 Florida’s crimi-
nal stalking statute has been revised to include “credible threats” com-
municated through electronic means.54 The statute defines a
“credible threat” as one that,
places the person who is the target of the threat in reasonable fear
for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family members or
individuals closely associated with the person, and which is made
with the apparent ability to carry out the threat to cause such
harm.55
Since the targets of trolling attacks are not acquainted in any
“real” way with the perpetrators of the attacks, there is usually no con-
duct that would qualify as a “credible threat” under the statute. Simi-
larly, while many of the attacks merely involve the creation or
dissemination of harmful, taunting images or video memes, they
rarely involve specific credible threats to the subject’s safety. As a re-
sult, state cyberstalking statutes nearly always fail to reach the actions
of trolling communities. When they do, it is by virtue of a fortunate
coincidence that some aspect of the statute can address some feature
of a specific attack. Florida’s cyberstalking statute is also illustrative of
this point in that the statute is densely written and intended to cover a
wide range of behaviors but incapable of addressing behaviors such as
posting and reposting of intentionally disturbing or grotesque images
designed to inflict harm upon a target selected at random.56 For ex-
ample, imagine a trolling attack in which a subject receives 100 ob-
scene or harmful messages. Of those 100 messages, two contain a
52. State Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/cyberstalking-and-cyberharassment-
laws.aspx (last updated Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Cyberstalking & Cyberharassment Laws].
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2012).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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specific, credible threat. A state cyberstalking statute would likely
cover only two of the messages, even if the other 98 messages were
more obscene or injurious.
The recent crop of cyberbullying statutes is just as ineffective for
combating trolling attacks as the cyberstalking statutes. Cyberbullying
statutes were written to combat online behavior that facilitates or exac-
erbates real-world bullying problems.57 All state cyberbullying statutes
limit their language to address behavior in schools by referring to “stu-
dents,” or “pupils.”58 By limiting the scope of the statutes to apply to
schoolchildren where there is a pre-existing connection between the
perpetrator and victim, the plain language of the cyberbullying stat-
utes makes them almost completely incapable of addressing trolling
attacks.59
State cyberharassment statutes come closest to addressing the
problems posed by trolling attacks. Most of these statutes still fall far
short of being an effective tool against these acts. Like the cyberstalk-
ing statutes, a majority of the cyberharassment statutes are mere addi-
tions of language to existing harassment statutes to include computers
as a means by which a person can engage in harassing behavior. State
harassment laws that address electronic or telephonic communication
are aimed primarily at obscene or harassing phone calls, lewd e-mails
targeted at specific people, or threats of extortion.60 These statutes,
however, are targeted at vastly different conduct than the online har-
assment in which trolling communities engage. A good example of
this type of cyberharassment statute is North Carolina’s.61 North Caro-
lina made it illegal to place phone calls that include lewd or profane
language, threats to the target or his or her family, or harassment for
any reason, regardless of whether a conversation takes place.62 Tacked
onto the end of a list of specifically prohibited telephone practices is
an inclusion of computers as a potential means for the prohibited
course of conduct.63 These types of statutes are insufficient to address
the harms of trolling attacks because, whereas harassment statutes
generally require that the behavior be directly targeted at a specific
57. Cyberbullying, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/is-
sues-research/educ/cyberbullying.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 708.7 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (West 2000);
WIS. STAT. § 947.0125 (2011).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196(a) (2012).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 14-196(b) (2012).
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person, many trolling attacks are the mere circulation of taunting or
offensive images or computer-altered images. Many subjects of trolling
attacks find out they have been targeted only once the circulation of
the attack reaches a certain level. Said another way, while nearly all
trolling attacks have victims, not all trolling attacks have targets. As a
result, laws requiring or identifying a specific target are not effective
tools for dealing with trolling attacks.
Moreover, the harms caused by online harassment necessarily dif-
fer from the “real world” harassment imagined by normal harassment
laws. In their present form, cyberharassment laws only address the
types of online harassment that have some real-world corollary. For
example, the harassment described by several state statutes is aimed
squarely at spam e-mail.64 Texas’ cyberharassment statute specifically
covers e-mail messages transmitted to a recipient without consent
when the sender intends to defraud the recipient.65 Others, like anti-
hacking laws, require an unauthorized invasion into a password-pro-
tected area.66 As a result, despite being more Internet-savvy, these stat-
utes are unable to address the type of trolling attacks in which an
attacker takes on a false identity in order to solicit embarrassing
materials from an unsuspecting person. These statutes also fail to
reach the more common attacks where a photograph or image is cir-
culated or altered in order to make it into an intentionally harmful
taunt designed to belittle the subject.
2. Insufficient Penalties
The penalties associated with state criminal statutes, as presently
constructed, are not a sufficient deterrent. Of the 38 states with
cyberharassment statutes, all but four strictly classify cyberharassment
as a misdemeanor.67 Similarly, a strong majority of state cyberstalking
statutes classify cyberstalking as a misdemeanor unless there is an ag-
gravating factor such as a violation of probation, a restraining order,
or another court order.68 This presents two problems. First, the puni-
tive weight of a misdemeanor conviction is a totally insufficient deter-
rent. Considering the amount of harm that some of these attacks have
inflicted upon their subjects and victims, punishment by fines or mini-
64. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2012).
65. Id.
66. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
67. See Cyberstalking & Cyberharassment Laws, supra note 52 (follow link to each states’
website to see individual statutes).
68. Id.; see also, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West 2012).
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mal jail time is insufficient. Second, because these communities oper-
ate in secret and because members carefully protect their identities,
the investigative burden is fairly high. Because of these burdens, mis-
demeanor convictions provide insufficient incentives for state and lo-
cal jurisdictions to invest time and resources prosecuting members of
trolling communities. Members of trolling communities have little
reason to fear prosecution and even less reason to fear stiff criminal
penalties if they are prosecuted.
3. Drawbacks of Good Criminal Statutes
The foregoing critique of present state law approaches via crimi-
nal law does not mean that there are no state criminal statutes capable
of addressing trolling attacks. Michigan’s cyberharassment law makes
it a felony for any person to post anything online without consent of
the victim when:
(a) The person knows or has reason to know that posting the mes-
sage could cause 2 or more separate noncontiguous acts of uncon-
sented contact with the victim.
(b) Posting the message is intended to cause conduct that would
make the victim feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated,
threatened, harassed, or molested.
(c) Conduct arising from posting the message would cause a rea-
sonable person to suffer emotional distress and to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
(d) Conduct arising from posting the message causes the victim to
suffer emotional distress and to feel terrorized, frightened, intimi-
dated, threatened, harassed, or molested.69
This language appears to apply to the types of online harassment
perpetrated by trolling communities. In addition, subjecting violators
to a felony conviction suggests that the Michigan legislature realized
the potential severity of trolling attacks. However, even a law as exten-
sive as Michigan’s has drawbacks. First, as Michigan’s statute demon-
strates, criminal statutes that can properly address trolling attacks may
require broad language so that they can be applied to the spectrum of
malicious circulations of materials and information that can be la-
beled “trolling attacks.” As a result, such laws could unintentionally
criminalize benign behavior. For example, imagine a scenario where
person A sends out a large e-mail invitation to a birthday party for her
friend B. A includes in the e-mail somewhat embarrassing photos of B
from previous parties or excursions. If B were offended, harassed, or
embarrassed enough and two or more e-mail recipients were to reply
69. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411s (West 2012).
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to everyone on the e-mail, including B, with pithy remarks about the
photos, a jury could find that A violated the statute and A could be
convicted of a felony.
Also, while making a violation of the act a felony provides a
stronger deterrent for would-be trolls, the cost and labor of investigat-
ing these crimes may prove to be too much for any jurisdiction to ever
prioritize. Prosecution and enforcement of even strong laws, like
Michigan’s, are still subject to the vagaries of the local prosecutor’s
office. Moreover, because the perpetrators of trolling attacks are
loosely associated Internet users, they may not all be located within a
single criminal jurisdiction. This dispersion could dramatically in-
crease the time and cost burdens on prosecutors. As a result, victims
of these attacks may never receive compensation for their injuries and
also may never get the satisfaction of seeing the perpetrators
convicted.
B. Privacy and Tort Approaches
Tort law offers several advantages over criminal law in addressing
the harms of malicious trolling attacks. First, as referenced above, civil
remedies may compensate victims directly for the harms of the at-
tacks. Second, in cases of community-based “viral” attacks that consist
of a high volume of individual images or files posted or circulated with
varying levels of malice,70 the plaintiff may tailor the pleading to the
perpetrators whose conduct caused the most injury. Finally, because
of the wide spectrum of behaviors that fall under the mantle of “trol-
ling attacks,”71 the comparative malleability of tort standards (as op-
posed to criminal rules) gives fact-finders a good deal of leeway in
assessing the harmfulness of online behavior and the resulting
injuries.72
Despite offering several potential advantages over regulation
through criminal statutes, existing tort law, which is designed to com-
pensate plaintiffs for injuries to reputation or for pure emotional dis-
tress, fails to address the conduct of Internet trolling attacks. As a
result, present tort law is an inadequate tool for regulating or prevent-
ing online trolling attacks.
70. See, e.g., supra notes 7–29 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., supra notes 7–29 and accompanying text.
72. See infra Part III.A.
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1. Privacy Torts
Trolling attacks frequently include features that are invasive to
the privacy of the subject or the target of the attack in a non-legal
sense. However, many of the most pernicious behaviors associated
with trolling attacks fall outside the bounds of the four traditional pri-
vacy torts: Intrusion into seclusion; misappropriation; public disclo-
sure of private facts; and false light. As a result, invasion of privacy
claims frequently fail to provide relief to those who have been harmed
by Internet trolling attacks.
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B defines the tort of
intrusion into seclusion: “One who intentionally intrudes, physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son.”73 Like the other privacy torts, the development of intrusion as a
tort did not anticipate the invention of the Internet. As a result, there
are few decisions that specifically address Internet trolling and case
law addressing comparable non-Internet behavior is similarly un-
helpful to plaintiffs. In Stilson v. Reader’s Digest Association,74 a Califor-
nia court of appeal held that unsolicited mailings do not constitute an
intrusion.75 A Florida court of appeal addressed a pre-Internet age
prank comparable to a proto-trolling attack in Harms v. Miami Daily
News, Inc.76 In that case, as a prank, a newspaper published plaintiff’s
phone number attached to the statement: “Wanna hear a sexy tele-
phone voice? Call ——— and ask for Louise.”77 The plaintiff, who was
actually named Louise, was flooded with unsolicited and objectiona-
ble telephone calls.78 The court declined to state whether the mere
act of publishing the number was an intrusion.79 Rather, it held that
the question of whether or not the conduct was sufficiently “objection-
able” was a question for the jury.80
Applying these notions to online trolling attacks is not clearly
beneficial to plaintiffs. Both Stilson and Harms conclude that being the
recipient of unwanted—and in the case of the Harms plaintiff, highly
objectionable—communications does not give rise to a cause of action
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
74. 104 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Ct. App. 1972).
75. Id. at 581.
76. 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
77. Id. at 716.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 718.
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for invasion of privacy as a matter of law.81 In addition, Harms appears
to preclude the idea that circulating semi-public information to a
wider audience for purposes that are outside the scope of the original
circulation is an intrusion as a matter of law.82 Many trolling attacks
involve either circulating an image of a subject to a wider audience
than the subject originally intended or flooding a target with un-
wanted communication, or both. As a result, the tort of intrusion into
seclusion seems to be historically unavailable to plaintiffs harmed by
trolling attacks.
The privacy tort of appropriation is tailored in a similarly poor
manner as applied to trolling attacks. Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 652C states: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit
the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.”83 Appropriation does not apply to trolling
cases for two reasons. First, it fails to address trolling cases in which
there is no appropriation of the plaintiff’s image or likeness. Second,
a more difficult hurdle is the requirement that the defendant’s appro-
priation of the plaintiff’s image or likeness benefit the defendant in
some way. This requirement is generally understood to be the acquisi-
tion of a pecuniary interest. Currently only four states, New York,
Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia go so far in their statutory language as
to explicitly require use “for advertising or the purposes of trade.”84 It
is not clear that trolling attacks that use the image of the plaintiff do
so in order to confer sufficiently concrete benefits upon the perpetra-
tor. For example, in the notorious “Fortuny Experiment” trolling at-
tack, the defendant took images of men responding to advertisements
for sex on Craigslist and published them.85 However, the defendant
Fortuny did not receive any pecuniary or other concrete benefit by
doing so.86 While the plaintiff could have conceivably argued that the
defendant did benefit through the approval of his peers as measured
in lulz,87 the alleged benefit of lulz is so far removed from traditional
notions of benefit in appropriation cases that it would be a novel argu-
ment, to say the least.
81. See Stilson v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 104 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 (Ct. App. 1972); Harms,
127 So. 2d at 718.
82. See Harms, 127 So. 2d at 718.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1965).
84. Id. § 652C, Reporter’s Note on § 652C (1981).
85. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 26.
86. Id.
87. See supra Part I.D (explaining the concept of “lulz”).
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The tort of public disclosure of private facts is covered by Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 652D:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to
the public.88
Comment (b) of section 652D enumerates the greatest barrier
for this tort: The courts’ position that the rule “applies only to public-
ity given to matters concerning the private, as distinguished from the
public, life of the individual. There is no liability when the defendant
merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is
already public.”89 This requirement would bar any claim seeking re-
covery for a trolling attack that involves the wider circulation of
images or materials than the target of the attack originally posted on
the Internet. The problem this poses is best illustrated by a hypotheti-
cal. Person A posts a picture of himself on a social networking or
photo-sharing site so his friends can view it at their leisure. Sometime
thereafter, a trolling community finds the photo amusing for whatever
reason and starts adding its own abusive commentary or creating de-
rivative images that are insulting to Person A. Eventually, the trolling
attack “goes viral” and Person A’s image is now viewed by countless
users, usually under unflattering circumstances and accompanied by
abusive or vulgar commentary. In this hypothetical, the public disclo-
sure of private facts tort is not available to Person A as a cause of ac-
tion because he made the original image public by posting it on the
first website.
A recent California case dealt with the source of an image that
led to a trolling attack. Catsouras v. Department of the California Highway
Patrol90 addressed the conduct of two California Highway Patrol
(“CHP”) officers who disseminated the image of a decapitated teen-
age girl from a traffic accident scene to friends and family as a Hallow-
een joke. The images found their way onto the wider Internet where
they were picked up by trolling communities.91 The family then found
out about the leaked pictures after being flooded with e-mails from
trolls seeking to make the “lulziest” post.92 The court held that the
family could maintain an action against the CHP officers who origi-
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
89. Id.
90. 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Ct. App. 2010).
91. See id. at 357–58.
92. See id.
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nally leaked the post, but did not address the subsequent actions of
the trolls themselves.93 Therefore, at present, relief under this theory
of invasion of privacy is only available to the victims of trolling attacks
when the material is not originally circulated by the victim. Liability
also appears limited to individuals who first circulated the images
without authorization, rather than the subsequent trolls or trolling
communities.94
Finally, the tort of false light presents the same kinds of tailoring
problems as the other privacy torts. Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 625E assigns civil liability to an actor who publicizes informa-
tion that places a plaintiff in a false light when the false light would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and “the actor had knowledge
of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized mat-
ter and the false light in which the other would be placed.”95 Com-
ment A to Section 652E limits the applicability of the false light to
disclosures of private information that necessarily include some kind
of falsehood about the plaintiff.96 Therefore, on the one hand, the
tort may include some behaviors associated with trolling attacks such
as the circulation of an altered image designed to impute some false-
hood about the subject’s character, history, or beliefs. On the other
hand, a wider spectrum of other behaviors, such as mere circulation
of an embarrassing photo or large scale circulation of vulgar commen-
tary about a targeted woman’s body, are not addressed by this tort.
Like the cyberstalking and cyberharassment statutes discussed earlier,
some but not all behaviors associated with trolling attacks may be cov-
ered by this tort. As a result, the scope and coverage of this one tort
are insufficient to regulate a phenomenon that encapsulates such a
broad range of behaviors.
C. Intentional Torts
Intentional torts present some of the same problems as privacy
torts. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46 assigns liability to a
person “who, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another[.]”97 That per-
son is subject to liability for such emotional distress and if bodily harm
93. Id. at 375.
94. See id. at 374.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
96. Id. § 652E cmt. a.
97. Id. § 46 (1965).
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to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.98 However, the au-
thorities are unanimous that not every assault on a target’s emotional
well-being or prevailing notions of decency will sustain a claim.99
“There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where
some one’s feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express
an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through
which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.”100 As
a result, the line between what is actionable as an intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and what falls to pieces under the premise
of de minimis non curat lex101 is frequently hazy and difficult to identify.
Additionally, in the instances where the trolling conduct is suffi-
cient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, the scope and coverage problems that hamper the effectiveness
of false light and cyberharassment statutes as a regulatory tool for In-
ternet trolling also limit the effectiveness of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Imagine the same trolling attack proposed earlier
that consists of 100 messages. Two just happen to fall under a state
cyberharassment statute, five more contain a falsehood that could sup-
port a claim for false light, and three more are extreme and outra-
geous enough to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. A plaintiff would still face a scenario where only 10% of the
conduct that injured him could provide him with any form of com-
pensation and 90% of the bad actors involved in the attack would not
incur any legal risk for their behavior. In this way, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, even when sufficient to address some trol-
ling behaviors, is insufficient as a regulatory tool.
D. Defamation
While trolling attacks are highly vulgar, offensive, or insulting,
they frequently do not fit our present legal definition of defamation.
In the broadest terms, defamation is the non-privileged publication of
a false statement that tends to injure the reputation of the plaintiff.102
The primary pitfall is that while a claim for defamation requires a spe-
cific falsehood, trolling attacks frequently do not include false state-
ments. Rather, their effectiveness lies in taking true statements and
98. Id.
99. Id. § 46 cmt. d.
100. Id.
101. “The law does not concern itself with trifles.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th
ed. 2009).
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
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placing them in different contexts, or taking semi-public information
and distributing it to a much broader audience. For example, the pri-
mary substance of the trolling attack relating to the claim in Catsouras
was the intentional posting of the leaked photos in places where un-
suspecting Internet users would happen upon them and the creation
of a fake MySpace tribute site to the deceased girl.103 Similarly, the
substance of the Fortuny Experiment involved the intentional publica-
tion of photographs, phone numbers, and private, sexually explicit e-
mails to a larger audience.104 This illustrates the difficulty that the law
of defamation faces as a tool for regulating this online behavior. Defa-
mation requires a falsehood, which many of the vilest trolling attacks
lack.
III. Proposed Solution
The randomness of the way trolls select their victims makes every-
one who uses the Internet in a conventional way a potential victim.
The harms caused by trolling attacks can be severe, and the limited
statistics on the subject show that these attacks are increasing.105 As a
result, the perpetrators of these attacks should face some significant
legal risks if they choose to engage in these activities. Most behaviors
that compose trolling attacks however, are too varied to squarely fit
into existing criminal laws or into the elements of existing tort law. So
how should the law go about addressing this disturbing micro-trend of
Internet usage?
A. Guiding Principles
The legal approach to trolling attacks should be governed by sev-
eral principles. First, it should provide sufficiently severe penalties to
raise the risk associated with starting or exacerbating a trolling attack.
Second, it should be able to provide relief to plaintiffs proportional to
the injuries they have suffered. Third, the approach should not chill
online speech more than is absolutely necessary. Finally, the approach
needs to be broad enough to cover the wide variety of behaviors that
103. Reynolds Holding, Family Can Sue Calif. Highway Patrol for Letting Daughter’s Acci-
dent Photos Spread Online, ABC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/ni-
cole-catsouras-fatal-accident-photos-web-family-sue/story?id=9731639#.UJ6wauOe-I2; see
also Greg Hardesty, Family Gets $2.4 Million Over Grisly Crash Images, ORANGE COUNTY REGIS-
TER (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/family-337967-catsouras-nikki.
html.
104. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 26.
105. Cf. Turner, supra note 47.
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comprise trolling attacks and to be adaptable to future techniques
adopted by trolling communities and individual trolls.
Despite the shortcomings of the current tort law described above,
it provides the best avenue for regulation for several reasons. Prosecu-
tion of trolls by way of criminal law requires a willingness of the au-
thorities and prosecutors to investigate and prosecute bad actors. By
contrast, tort law allows injured parties to identify the most injurious
behaviors and tailor pleadings accordingly. Also, while new legislation
that provides either new criminal penalties or new civil remedies can
limit future applicability, new tort principles have historically demon-
strated the ability to adapt to new and different social circumstances.
An example of just such an adoption was the use of strict liability for
defectively manufactured products in response to the development of
mass-produced goods.106 In addition, existing doctrinal safeguards al-
ready ensure that the limitations on speech via a tort scheme will not
chill speech any more than is constitutionally permitted.107 Tort law
also allows injured parties to seek adequate relief and for fact-finders
to weigh all relevant factors in determining the remedy, which pro-
vides much-needed flexibility in the context of trolling attacks.
B. Updating Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Courts should interpret the doctrine of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts to apply to the rise of trolling communities and the attacks
in which they engage. A plaintiff who is injured in a trolling attack
should be able to prevail under this theory of invasion of privacy upon
an affirmative showing that:
(1) The defendant circulated private or semi-private images or
material online without consent of the author or subject of the mate-
rial; and
(2) The defendant knew or should have known that his actions
would expand the circulation of the online material beyond the scope
of its intended circulation; and
(3) The defendant knew or should have known that the circula-
tion of the material would be offensive or otherwise harmful to the
subject of the circulated material; or
(4) The defendant circulated the material in a manner inten-
tionally designed to harm the target or subject of the material or with
reckless disregard to the harm the circulation would likely cause.
106. Francis J. O’Brien, The History of Products Liability, 62 TUL. L. REV. 313, 322 (1988).
107. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964).
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C. Definitions and Benefits
The most dramatic departure from the existing tort of public dis-
closure is the elimination of the requirement that the disclosed mater-
ials are strictly private. As discussed earlier, the traditional approach
to public disclosure bars liability to individuals who make their own
information public. In the offline context, this made sense. It was con-
tradictory for a plaintiff to take a public action and then raise an issue
about the number of people that saw the act. As online posting, shar-
ing, and storage of materials increasingly becomes the norm, the lines
between public and private have become less clear. For example, im-
agine that person A sends an e-mail to three of her friends with photo-
graphs from a weekend excursion to Las Vegas. One of the friends, B,
places one of the photographs—a picture of A in a mildly embarrass-
ing pose—on her Facebook page and has less stringent privacy set-
tings than A. From there, an Internet troll finds some aspect of the
picture amusing and, in short order, the picture, accompanied by vul-
gar insults and commentary, goes viral. A loses her job as a result.
Under the traditional approach to public disclosure, A would almost
certainly be barred from recovery because she had originally e-mailed
the photos to the three friends and thus they were no longer “private.”
In the second element, the new approach recognizes that many
materials posted, stored, and shared online have an intended circula-
tion and it is very hard to keep materials strictly “private” under these
circumstances. Private materials have no intended circulation; semi-
private materials have a limited intended circulation. This is an impor-
tant distinction online. Under this approach, the plaintiff must make
an affirmative showing of who made up the anticipated audience and
how the further circulation was outside the scope of the intended au-
dience. This showing can be made in a variety of ways such as the e-
mail recipient list, social network privacy settings, online invitation
lists, or password protection. Conversely, if a plaintiff was genuinely
cavalier about disseminating their information, a jury could find that
the anticipated audience was too nebulously defined and deny a plain-
tiff seeking to classify materials as “semi-private.”
The last change that the new approach adopts is a scienter108 re-
quirement. A defendant must know or should know that his actions
would be harmful. This will help to reduce the potential for liability in
108. “A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the conse-
quences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly . . . .”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009).
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cases of honest mistake or more benign disclosures. Finally, the fourth
element borrows the standard of intentional or reckless behavior from
the other intentional torts. This is necessary because the core behav-
iors of trolling attacks and the lulz phenomenon help distinguish be-
tween those individuals who conceive or start an attack and those who
merely perpetuate an attack.
The adoption of these factors into consideration of public disclo-
sure in the online setting satisfies all the principles set forth above in
Part II.A. First, as a tort standard, it will have the flexibility to attach
liability commensurate with harm. Second, attaching significance to
the broadened circulation of online materials properly recognizes
that the harm of these attacks frequently derives not from mere disclo-
sure, but from broadened disclosure to unintended recipients. By at-
taching liability to the amount that the materials are circulated, this
interpretation attaches the risk of liability more proportionally to the
harm actually inflicted by trolling attacks. In this way, fact-finders will
be able to assign penalties based on the breadth of circulation.
Additionally, the emphasis on circulation is broad enough to in-
clude all behaviors of which trolling attacks consist. To illustrate, while
there might be great variety in the manner in which the materials of a
trolling attack are circulated, trolling attacks all necessarily involve the
circulation of the materials in order to effectuate their goals. There-
fore, future attacks—regardless of their form—will necessarily fall
within the terms of this interpretative standard.
One of the main potential dangers with any regime regulating
speech is the possibility that it will apply to more speech than is abso-
lutely necessary. These problems most frequently arise in speech in-
volving public figures. While most of the trolling attacks this proposal
seeks to regulate are aimed at private individuals, the attacks are not
limited to them. For example, in 2011, the trolling group LulzSec
launched a coordinated attack on the Facebook page of Republican
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich.109 While elements of this attack
were consistent with the juvenile and occasionally vulgar behaviors of
other trolling attacks, some of the content (including the decision to
attack a political figure) was entitled to some level of constitutional
protection. However, existing protections can be easily applied to this
109. Jeromie Williams, LulzSec Launches Post South Carolina Primary Trolling Attack On
Newt Gingrich Facebook Page, JEROMIE WILLIAMS EATS THE INTERNET FOR BREAKFAST (Oct. 15,
2012, 4:05 PM), http://jeromiewilliams.com/2012/01/22/lulzsec-launches-post-south-car-
olina-primary-trolling-attack-on-newt-gingrich-facebook-page/.
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standard to ensure that it does not curtail more speech than is
constitutional.
The Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times v. Sullivan110
provides the proper level of constitutional protection.111 In Sullivan,
the Court held that a public figure may not recover civil damages for
defamation absent a showing that the defamatory statements were
made with actual malice.112 The Court went on to define actual malice
as reckless disregard for the truth of the assertion.113 Three years
later, the Court extended the doctrine of actual malice into the realm
of invasion of privacy in Time, Inc. v. Hill.114 In Hill, the Court held
that the First Amendment barred a public figure from recovering for
false light absent a showing of actual malice.115 The actual malice stan-
dard may be applied to the proposed interpretation of public disclo-
sure of private facts. Applying this standard to attacks on public
figures would prohibit only known falsehoods or reckless falsehoods.
The standard would still permit liability for the intentionally disrup-
tive, the nonsensical, and the juvenile statements that comprise most
trolling attacks. This would strike the proper balance between al-
lowing public figures to defend themselves and the First Amendment.
Conclusion
The harms posed by coordinated trolling attacks are too great to
ignore. Lulz have provided sufficient motivation to trolls to increase
their frequency and potential for harm. Existing criminal statutes do
not properly address the problem. In addition, while present tort law
can address some of the potential harms, it fails to adequately encom-
pass all the behaviors associated with trolling attacks. The existing
framework of privacy torts should be adapted and updated to deal
with the threats to privacy and the risk of reputational harm that are
posed by trolling attacks. The adaptation should come in the form of
a new interpretation of the tort of public disclosure of private facts as
it pertains to online conduct. The emphasis should be on the circula-
tion of materials rather than simple disclosure. The actual malice stan-
dard contained in New York Times v. Sullivan provides sufficient
constitutional protections to the legitimate speech aspects of trolling
110. 376 U.S. 254, 302 (1964).
111. Id. at 285–92.
112. Id. at 279–80.
113. Id. at 280.
114. 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967).
115. Id. at 384 n.8.
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behavior. The First Amendment standard is entirely compatible
with—and can be easily overlaid onto—this new approach to public
disclosure of private facts. Our legal system already has the proper
pieces to compensate victims of malicious online attacks, however, a
new approach to privacy torts is needed to bring the pieces together.
The adoption of the approach laid out above would be a substantial
step in the right direction.
